A small tool to view real-world ActivityPub objects as JSON! Enter a URL
or username from Mastodon or a similar service below, and we'll send a
request with
the right
Accept
header
to the server to view the underlying object.
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams",
{
"ostatus": "http://ostatus.org#",
"atomUri": "ostatus:atomUri",
"inReplyToAtomUri": "ostatus:inReplyToAtomUri",
"conversation": "ostatus:conversation",
"sensitive": "as:sensitive",
"toot": "http://joinmastodon.org/ns#",
"votersCount": "toot:votersCount",
"Hashtag": "as:Hashtag"
}
],
"id": "https://social.librem.one/users/eighthave/statuses/114777855225886867",
"type": "Note",
"summary": null,
"inReplyTo": null,
"published": "2025-07-01T11:58:02Z",
"url": "https://social.librem.one/@eighthave/114777855225886867",
"attributedTo": "https://social.librem.one/users/eighthave",
"to": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams#Public"
],
"cc": [
"https://social.librem.one/users/eighthave/followers"
],
"sensitive": false,
"atomUri": "https://social.librem.one/users/eighthave/statuses/114777855225886867",
"inReplyToAtomUri": null,
"conversation": "tag:librem.one,2025-07-01:objectId=66206694:objectType=Conversation",
"content": "<p>A question to <a href=\"https://social.librem.one/tags/Google\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>Google</span></a> about whether they could allowlist apps for sideloading they know to be legit. They punted and gave a weak attempt at a technical reason. They say their is a 100 million apps out there, so how could they ever? And malicious apps can impersonate the Application ID. Sure, true, but they could also allowlist based on all the signing keys, which cannot be simply faked and they already manage in <a href=\"https://social.librem.one/tags/GooglePlay\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>GooglePlay</span></a></p><p><a href=\"https://social.librem.one/tags/DigitalMarketsAct\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>DigitalMarketsAct</span></a> <a href=\"https://social.librem.one/tags/Alphabet\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>Alphabet</span></a> <a href=\"https://social.librem.one/tags/EuropeanCommission\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>EuropeanCommission</span></a> <a href=\"https://social.librem.one/tags/EC\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>EC</span></a> <a href=\"https://social.librem.one/tags/DMA\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>DMA</span></a> <a href=\"https://social.librem.one/tags/DMAWorkshop\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>DMAWorkshop</span></a></p>",
"contentMap": {
"en": "<p>A question to <a href=\"https://social.librem.one/tags/Google\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>Google</span></a> about whether they could allowlist apps for sideloading they know to be legit. They punted and gave a weak attempt at a technical reason. They say their is a 100 million apps out there, so how could they ever? And malicious apps can impersonate the Application ID. Sure, true, but they could also allowlist based on all the signing keys, which cannot be simply faked and they already manage in <a href=\"https://social.librem.one/tags/GooglePlay\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>GooglePlay</span></a></p><p><a href=\"https://social.librem.one/tags/DigitalMarketsAct\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>DigitalMarketsAct</span></a> <a href=\"https://social.librem.one/tags/Alphabet\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>Alphabet</span></a> <a href=\"https://social.librem.one/tags/EuropeanCommission\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>EuropeanCommission</span></a> <a href=\"https://social.librem.one/tags/EC\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>EC</span></a> <a href=\"https://social.librem.one/tags/DMA\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>DMA</span></a> <a href=\"https://social.librem.one/tags/DMAWorkshop\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>DMAWorkshop</span></a></p>"
},
"attachment": [],
"tag": [
{
"type": "Hashtag",
"href": "https://social.librem.one/tags/dmaworkshop",
"name": "#dmaworkshop"
},
{
"type": "Hashtag",
"href": "https://social.librem.one/tags/dma",
"name": "#dma"
},
{
"type": "Hashtag",
"href": "https://social.librem.one/tags/ec",
"name": "#ec"
},
{
"type": "Hashtag",
"href": "https://social.librem.one/tags/europeancommission",
"name": "#europeancommission"
},
{
"type": "Hashtag",
"href": "https://social.librem.one/tags/alphabet",
"name": "#alphabet"
},
{
"type": "Hashtag",
"href": "https://social.librem.one/tags/digitalmarketsact",
"name": "#digitalmarketsact"
},
{
"type": "Hashtag",
"href": "https://social.librem.one/tags/googleplay",
"name": "#googleplay"
},
{
"type": "Hashtag",
"href": "https://social.librem.one/tags/google",
"name": "#google"
}
],
"replies": {
"id": "https://social.librem.one/users/eighthave/statuses/114777855225886867/replies",
"type": "Collection",
"first": {
"type": "CollectionPage",
"next": "https://social.librem.one/users/eighthave/statuses/114777855225886867/replies?only_other_accounts=true&page=true",
"partOf": "https://social.librem.one/users/eighthave/statuses/114777855225886867/replies",
"items": []
}
}
}