A small tool to view real-world ActivityPub objects as JSON! Enter a URL
or username from Mastodon or a similar service below, and we'll send a
request with
the right
Accept
header
to the server to view the underlying object.
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams",
{
"ostatus": "http://ostatus.org#",
"atomUri": "ostatus:atomUri",
"inReplyToAtomUri": "ostatus:inReplyToAtomUri",
"conversation": "ostatus:conversation",
"sensitive": "as:sensitive",
"toot": "http://joinmastodon.org/ns#",
"votersCount": "toot:votersCount",
"litepub": "http://litepub.social/ns#",
"directMessage": "litepub:directMessage",
"Hashtag": "as:Hashtag"
}
],
"id": "https://infosec.exchange/users/tasket/statuses/113291593050301552",
"type": "Note",
"summary": null,
"inReplyTo": null,
"published": "2024-10-12T00:22:00Z",
"url": "https://infosec.exchange/@tasket/113291593050301552",
"attributedTo": "https://infosec.exchange/users/tasket",
"to": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams#Public"
],
"cc": [
"https://infosec.exchange/users/tasket/followers",
"https://mastodon.social/users/campuscodi"
],
"sensitive": false,
"atomUri": "https://infosec.exchange/users/tasket/statuses/113291593050301552",
"inReplyToAtomUri": null,
"conversation": "tag:mastodon.social,2024-10-11:objectId=820376377:objectType=Conversation",
"content": "<p><span class=\"h-card\" translate=\"no\"><a href=\"https://mastodon.social/@campuscodi\" class=\"u-url mention\" rel=\"nofollow noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">@<span>campuscodi</span></a></span> That's why your <a href=\"https://infosec.exchange/tags/Torbrowser\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>Torbrowser</span></a> should be running in a VM largely isolated from the Tor router. The <a href=\"https://infosec.exchange/tags/Whonix\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>Whonix</span></a> distro is a good example of this security arrangement.</p><p>Furthermore, your browser could get pwned and then the attacker only needs a garden variety priv escalation to possibly access your UEFI firmware and infest it. With VM isolation in effect, the attacker has to use a \"VM breakout\" escalation which is a much, much higher bar.</p><p><a href=\"https://infosec.exchange/tags/0day\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>0day</span></a> <a href=\"https://infosec.exchange/tags/browser\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>browser</span></a></p>",
"contentMap": {
"en": "<p><span class=\"h-card\" translate=\"no\"><a href=\"https://mastodon.social/@campuscodi\" class=\"u-url mention\" rel=\"nofollow noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">@<span>campuscodi</span></a></span> That's why your <a href=\"https://infosec.exchange/tags/Torbrowser\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>Torbrowser</span></a> should be running in a VM largely isolated from the Tor router. The <a href=\"https://infosec.exchange/tags/Whonix\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>Whonix</span></a> distro is a good example of this security arrangement.</p><p>Furthermore, your browser could get pwned and then the attacker only needs a garden variety priv escalation to possibly access your UEFI firmware and infest it. With VM isolation in effect, the attacker has to use a \"VM breakout\" escalation which is a much, much higher bar.</p><p><a href=\"https://infosec.exchange/tags/0day\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>0day</span></a> <a href=\"https://infosec.exchange/tags/browser\" class=\"mention hashtag\" rel=\"tag\">#<span>browser</span></a></p>"
},
"attachment": [],
"tag": [
{
"type": "Mention",
"href": "https://mastodon.social/users/campuscodi",
"name": "@campuscodi@mastodon.social"
},
{
"type": "Hashtag",
"href": "https://infosec.exchange/tags/torbrowser",
"name": "#torbrowser"
},
{
"type": "Hashtag",
"href": "https://infosec.exchange/tags/whonix",
"name": "#whonix"
},
{
"type": "Hashtag",
"href": "https://infosec.exchange/tags/0day",
"name": "#0day"
},
{
"type": "Hashtag",
"href": "https://infosec.exchange/tags/browser",
"name": "#browser"
}
],
"replies": {
"id": "https://infosec.exchange/users/tasket/statuses/113291593050301552/replies",
"type": "Collection",
"first": {
"type": "CollectionPage",
"next": "https://infosec.exchange/users/tasket/statuses/113291593050301552/replies?only_other_accounts=true&page=true",
"partOf": "https://infosec.exchange/users/tasket/statuses/113291593050301552/replies",
"items": []
}
},
"likes": {
"id": "https://infosec.exchange/users/tasket/statuses/113291593050301552/likes",
"type": "Collection",
"totalItems": 1
},
"shares": {
"id": "https://infosec.exchange/users/tasket/statuses/113291593050301552/shares",
"type": "Collection",
"totalItems": 1
}
}